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INTRODUCTION

The business historian Alfred Chandler holds that the structure of an
organization has a significant effect on the policies it pursues. 1 This article
reviews the origins and early history of the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), and examines the following question: had EPA been structured
differently, would it have pursued different policies? With the benefit of
hindsight, it is tempting to criticize EPA for assuming the form that it did.
The United States may have had better natural resource and environmental
protection policies if some of the principles of comprehensive environmental
management ("CEM") considered at EPA's birth had been followed. This
article explains why these principles were not consistently carried out.
The article is organized as follows. It first sets forth the principles of CEM
as articulated by influential writers and thinkers at the time of EPA's
organization in 1970. Second, it discusses how these principles affected the
staff group that created EPA and had primary responsibility for designing the
agency-the staff of the Ash Council. Third, it focuses on how these
principles were used to forge EPA's internal structure, that is, the extent to
which they were used to organize the agency according to the so-called
"functional" model that was under discussion at the time. Fourth, the article
explains how the principles of CEM affected EPA's staff in carrying out its dayto-day activities. Finally, the article gives some reasons for the imperfect
realization of CEM principles and speculates about the consequences for
environmental and natural resource policy of such imperfect realization.
II
THE PRINCIPLES OF COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

The principles of CEM that influenced EPA during its organizational stage
came from a number of sources. The following describes the different
versions of CEM as expressed in the ecology, economics, and political science
literature of the time.
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CEM in the Ecology Literature

The history of the environmental movement can be divided into three
stages: conservation, public health, and natural beauty. 2 The conservation
stage was directed mainly at land-use problems, wilderness preservation, and
the exploration of resources such as forests and waterways. During this stage
environmentalists viewed issues in isolation from one another. The next
stage, public health, led to a concentration on pathogenic organisms.
Aesthetic considerations generally were ignored while attention was directed
to the links between environmental conditions and chronic diseases. The
1960s concern for natural beauty started a trend toward a "holistic" or
"comprehensive view" of environmental problems. 3 The goals of the
environmentalists moved toward realizing ecological precepts like the
"balance of nature" and a "steady state" environment. 4 Environmentalists
hoped to achieve environmental stability, or some type of continuing process
of dynamic homeostasis and self-renewal. In order to illustrate these
concepts, they employed the metaphor "spaceship earth." The earth was
seen as a unified system dependent upon its interrelating parts. As a
spaceship, it had surpluses, redundancy, and back-up capacity, but a limited
carrying capacity which required that people recycle and re-use resources to
5
the extent feasible.
B.

CEM in the Economics Literature

At the time of EPA's organization, economists focused on the flow of
materials from the environment to the economy and the return flow of these
materials to the environment as wastes or residuals. 6 They developed the
materials balance model, under which, if there were no "inventory
accumulation," the mass of residuals returning to the environment had to
equal the mass of basic fuels, gases, foods, minerals, and other raw materials
leaving the environment and entering the economic system. 7 The
comprehensive view provided by this model made it impossible to take a
narrow view of pollution. Air, water, and soil pollution could not be seen as
separate, unrelated problems. 8 Moreover, it was impossible for humans to
isolate the impact of their actions on the environment. Human economic
actions had multiple effects, some good and some bad. Careful analysis and
2. Lynton K. Caldwell, Environment: A Challengefor Modern Society 33-50 (Natural History Press,
1970).
3. Id at 67.
4. Id at 72.
5. Id at 80-87. See also Lynton K. Caldwell, A1an and His Environment. Polio , and Administration
14-18 (Harper & Row, 1975).
6. A. Mvrick Freeman III, Robert H. Haveman & Allen V. Kneese, The Economics of Environmental
Polic0 33 (John Wiley & Sons, 1973).
7. Id at I 1-19. "Accumulation of inventory" means stocks of plants, equipment, consumer
durables, residual buildings, and other goods. See id at 13.
8. Id at 31-32.
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expertise were needed to trace the effects and ramifications of economic
activities and to judge their net impact.9
Economists presented four options for controlling pollution. Society
could: (1) reduce the amount of materials and energy used in economic
activity; (2) treat waste products in order to make them less harmful to the
environment; (3) choose the time and place of the discharge of waste products
in order to minimize their damage; or (4) augment the environment's waste
assimilative capacities through investment.' 0
C.

CEM in the Political Science Literature

During EPA's organizational period, political scientists criticized existing
pollution control programs as being too fragmented and decentralized to
accomplish the goals that ecologists and economists advocated.'t Dispersion
of power over pollution control prevented decisive action and hindered
comprehensive or radical alterations of policy. Changes in environmental
policy were too incremental. Public or private groups that were either
opposed to the alterations or were threatened by resulting alterations of the
power structure blocked policy changes.' 2 Political scientists felt that
authority should be concentrated in a single national agency that would
coordinate fragmented environmental programs and take a broad view of
environmental problems.' 3 The political scientists thought that during the
late 1960s the government lacked both the appropriate organization and the
necessary authority to deal with environmental degradation.
D.

Analysis of the Diverse Concepts of CEM

The CEM concepts reflected in these writings took into account ecological
arguments advocating steady-state equilibrium, economic arguments
advocating monitoring the movement of all materials into and out of the
environment, and political arguments advocating rapid policy innovation.
Ecologists believed that nature deserved ultimate respect and thus the
environment should be managed as a whole.14 Since, in their view, everything
was inter-connected, the ecologists called for systematic examination of the
impact of human activities on nature. To this end, CEM aimed to evaluate
national growth policies, because GNP, the traditional means of assessing
growth, did not fully measure all components of growth. For instance, GNP
did not adequately account for aesthetic values and collective enjoyments, nor
did it take into account natural processes (for example, damage to species
9.
10.
1I.
1973).
12.
13.
14.
Revelle

Id at 128.
Id at 25-31.
David F. Paulsen & Robert B. Denhardt, eds, Pollution and Public Policy (Dodd, Mead & Co,
Walter A. Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern 95 (Praeger, 1973).
Id at 108.
S. Dillon Ripley & Helmut K. Brechner, Ecosystem Science as a Point of Synthesis, in Roger
& Hans H. Landsberg, eds, America's Changing Environment 20-31 (Beacon Press, 1967).
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regardless of whether the processes creating the damage were useful to
humans).
Economists did not question the primacy of growth. 15 For them, CEM
concerned the existence of market defects. The relationship between human
activity and the natural world had to be understood as a system in which
nature provided the inputs to economic activity and absorbed the outputs
after economic activity had taken place-after raw materials had been
extracted, transformed into useful products, and consumed. The price system
was not fully efficient in reflecting this system because it did not adequately
account for the costs of externalities, such as damage to the air and water and
losses in the value of nature's inputs to future generations. In order for the
system to be efficient, externalities had to be internalized through taxes and
user charges. With the "true costs" of production reflected in the price
system, there would be a greater incentive to use less of a nonrenewable or
polluting resource, to conserve, or to find substitutes, alternatives, or
replacements.

16

Consumer activists, like those associated with Ralph Nader, considered the
political argument to be paramount. CEM was one way to concentrate
government authority and upgrade programs that in the past had been
accorded low status. Nader reports denounced existing air and water
pollution control programs, maintaining that the bureaucracy had not been
sufficiently active in implementing laws passed by Congress.' 7 Senator
Edmund Muskie, a Democrat from Maine, a presidential contender, and an
environmental proponent whom the Nader groups criticized, admitted that
the "administration of federal programs did not match the gravity of the
problems."' 8 The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
held hearings to investigate organizational problems.' 9 Witnesses testified
that pollution control did not have a high enough priority. The National Air
Pollution Control Administration ("NAPCA") was "buried" in the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"). Similarly, the
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration ("FWPCA") was found at the
bottom level of the Department of Interior. Both NAPCA and FWPCA
suffered from frequent reorganization, bureaucratic layering, distance from
the secretary, and strong competition for limited resources from other
growing agencies.
15. See, for example, Allen V. Kneese, Robert U. Ayres & Ralph C. D'Arge, Economics and the
Environment: A Materials Balance Approach 9 (Resources for the Future, 1970).
16. Allen V. Kneese, Analysis of Environmental Pollution, in Robert Dorfman & Nancy Dorfman,
eds, Economics of the Environment 39-42 (W. W. Norton, 1972); see also Larry E. Ruff, The Economic
Common Sense of Pollution, in Dorfman & Dorfman, Economics of the Environment 13-15 (cited in this
note).

17. John C. Esposito, Vanishing Air 259-98 (Grossman, 1970); David Zwick & Marcy Benstock,
JIater I'asteland 152-82 (Grossman, 1971).
18. Charles 0. Jones, Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of Pollution Control 175 (U Pittsburgh Press,
1975).
19. Hearings on Air Pollution Control and Solid Wastes Recycling before the Subcommittee on
Public Health and Welfare of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st
Cong, Ist & 2d Sess (1969-1970).
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A concern for the administration of pollution control programs also
motivated White House staff to favor program consolidation. 20 The reasons
for consolidation differed between consumer activists and Congress, on the
one hand, and the White House, on the other. Consumer activists and
Congress sought greater enforcement powers and regulatory authority for a
range of disparate programs covering diverse media, such as air, water, soil,
and pesticides. In contrast, the White House staff believed that a more
systematic approach to environmental problems-an approach that would
consider alternative policies and establish priorities-would give the executive
branch greater control. Business leaders also expressed displeasure with the
existing system. Instead of diverse regulatory programs administered by
separate layers in the bureaucracy and interpreted differently in regional and
state settings, they sought a single focal point for setting standards and
implementing environmental laws. A 1970 poll conducted for Fortune
magazine showed that 53 percent of business executives favored a single
2
national agency to establish standards. '
E.

The President's Message

Although intentions differed among the various parties that proposed
creating a new environmental agency, support for such an agency from all
quarters was high. Because of this broad support, President Nixon, in his
1970 "Message on the Environment," could afford to be clear about the need
for reorganization:
To meet future needs, many organizational changes will . . .be needed. Federal
institutions for dealing with the environment and natural resources have developed
piecemeal over the years in response to specific needs, not all of which were originally
perceived in the light of the concerns we recognize today. Many of their missions
appear to overlap, and even to conflict. 2 2

The President asked the Ash Council to study the organization of federal
23
environmental, natural resource, and oceanographic programs.
III
THE FORMATION PROCESS

A.

The Ash Council

The president invariably delegates
a proposal for the reorganization of
Reorganization Plan Number 3 that
Agency, President Nixon delegated

to a staff group the authority to prepare
an agency or program. In the case of
created the Environmental Protection
this authority to the staff of the Ash

20. Council on Environmental Quality, EnvironmentalQuality: The First Annual Report of the Council
on Environmental Quality 233 (US Govt Printing Office, 1970) ("CEQ The First Annual Report").
21. See Robert S. Diamond, What Business Thinks, Fortune 118 (Feb 1970).
22. The President's Message on the Environment, February 10, 1970, reprinted in CEQ The
First Annual Report at 254, 270 (cited in note 20).
23. Id.
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Council. 24 In order to understand the reasons for creating EPA, it is
necessary to examine the motivations of this staff group and the factors that
influenced its deliberations. Like the creators of the War on Poverty, the
designers of EPA can be characterized as professional reformers. They

displayed an independence of judgment and tried to maintain relative
immunity from outside criticism. 25 They were also attracted to esoteric ideas
and to advanced concepts in economics and ecology, such as residuals
management. However, the staff of the Ash Council could not achieve
independence from contrary political pressures.26
The politics involved in the reorganization process tempered the values
and ideas that were then influencing the Ash Council staff in its design of
EPA. 2 7 For example, the staff believed that the wastes of an affluent society
should be comprehensively managed and that environmentalists should be
represented by a department or agency in the federal structure. Moreover,
the belief that pollution problems would probably worsen over time
influenced the council's deliberations. In order both to cope with existing
pollution problems and to anticipate future problems, the staff advocated
consolidating pollution control programs in a separate department. This
recommendation had to overcome various objections, however, before the
President agreed to create EPA.

Opposing political actors who criticized creating a separate pollution
control department offered counter-proposals of their own. A Domestic
Council task force suggested that the Ash Council design a new department of
natural resources, 28 while Senators Hugh Scott and Edmund Muskie
introduced bills to create an independent environmental protection
administration. 29 The Ash Council staff was divided over which proposal it
should recommend to the President. Should it propose a large department
with a broad environmental quality mission or should it call for a smaller
24. Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding 21-37 (The Free Press, 1970).
25. Message of the President Relative to Reorganization Plans Nos 3-4 of 1970, July 9, 1970,
cited in CEQ The First Annual Report 294-305 (cited in note 20); Message of the President
Transmitting Reorganization Plan No 3 of 1970,July 9, 1970, in CEQ The FirstAnnual Report 306-07
(cited in note 20).
26. See Kneese, Ayres & D'Arge, Economics and the Environment at 29 (cited in note 15).
27. Shortly after President Nixon took office in January 1969, he appointed Roy Ash, a former
Litton Industries executive, to head the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization
("PACEO"). Serving with Ash on the Council were Frederick R. Kappel, former chairman of the
board of AT&T; Walter N. Thayer, president of Whitney Communications Corporation; Richard M.
Paget, president of the management consulting firm Cresap, McCormick, and Paget; Dr. George P.
Baker, retiring dean of the Harvard Business School; and the Honorable John B. Connally, former
governor of Texas and practicing lawyer. While Ash played an active role in the proceedings that led
to the proposal to establish EPA, the other council members did not. They functioned as an
absentee board of directors. The previous reorganization Plan Number 2, developed by the Ash
Council prior to its work on environmental programs, changed the Bureau of the Budget into the
Office of Management and the Budget ("OMB") and created the Domestic Council in the Executive
Office. Gregory Mills, Design for Environmental Protection I (JFK School of Govt, 1974) (C 16-74-026).
28. Alfred A. Marcus, Promise and Performance 32 (Greenwood Press, 1980). The domestic
council was a White House unit led in 1969 by John Erlichman.
29. Alfred A. Marcus, lthat Does Reorganization Accomplish: The Case of the EPA 16 (unpublished
PhD dissertation, Harvard U, 1970).
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bureaucratic entity with a specific pollution control focus? Both the staff
coordinator, Amory Bradford, and Roy Ash initially favored creating a
department that would combine natural resources and pollution control
functions, but they did so for different reasons. While Bradford thought that
a large department could formulate and carry out a balanced growth policy,
Ash thought that the secretary of a large department that would handle
competing interests would be more loyal to the White House than to the
department's constituencies. 3 0 Before the Ash Council sent its final proposal
to the President, it consulted the heads of the affected existing departments
who were reluctant to give up the personnel, resources, and authority that a
new environmental organization would need. In response to this persistent
reluctance, the President modified the final proposals sent to him by the Ash
3
Council. '
The Ash Council staff had to steer the plan to create EPA through this
complex political obstacle course. The process of reaching agreement
produced a more modest reorganization plan than the one originally called
for by the Domestic Council task force. Natural resource and pollution
control functions were not combined in a large department with a broad
environmental quality mission. The following account of EPA's origins traces
how the decision was made to focus EPA's mission on pollution control.
B.

Opposing Suggestions

A Domestic Council task force led by John Whittaker was organized to
prepare the President's "Message on the Environment," which he delivered in
February 1970.32 In November 1969, while preparing the presidential
address, the task force advised the Ash Council that environmental protection
and natural resource programs should be top priority targets for
reorganization. The task force recommended that the Ash Council consider
creating a new Department of Natural Resources. 3 3 The task force noted that,
for more than fifty years, various administrations had studied and advocated
creating a Department of Natural Resources but that congressional
committees, government bureaus, and special interest groups had not
supported such a new department. Previous suggestions to amalgamate
natural resource programs had come from Gifford Pinchot and his
followers. 3 4 In contrast to John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club, the Pinchot
group had not been primarily concerned with the preservation of natural
conditions for aesthetic purposes; rather, the group was concerned with the
30. Marcus, Promise and Performance at 32 (cited in note 28).
31. Id at 18-23. See note 59 and accompanying text.
32. CEQ The First Annual Report at 254-71 (cited in note 20). Serving on this task force were
government lawyers John Quarles and Roger Starlow, scientist John Buckley, and OMB Budget
Examiner Al Aim-all of whom later became leading executives in EPA.
33. Marcus, Promise and Performance at 32 (cited in note 28).
34. See Gifford Pinchot, The Birth of Conservation, in Roderick Nash, ed, The American Environment
39-42 (Addison Wesley, 1968).
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sparing and economical use of natural resources for economic development.3 5
However, a new interest in environmental quality transcended the old
conservationist debate between preservationists and developers. The
Domestic Council task force's suggestion for reorganization was inspired by a
view of humans as space voyagers on spaceship earth,3 6 which emphasized
preserving the eco-balance and decontaminating an already polluted
environment. According to the task force, the increased public support for
enhancing environmental quality gave the Ash Council an opportunity to
overcome the ordinary resistance to reorganization found in committees,
37
bureaus, and special interest groups.
Senator Muskie's Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution considered
revising existing air and water pollution laws and held hearings for that
purpose. However, even with this legislative activity, the task force's efforts to
design a new department did not take into account existing or proposed
environmental legislation because complete review of all laws dealing with the
38
environment was not possible in the short period of time allotted.
Moreover, the job of examining environmental legislation had been reserved
for the Environmental Quality Council in the White House.3 9 Thus warned to
keep its distance from the legislative branch, the Ash Council was constrained
from doing an extensive review of existing environmental statutes. The Ash
Council designed a bureaucracy to fit the changing conception of the
environmental problem, not one that would be an effective instrument for
implementing existing laws.
Members of Congress were not directly involved in the Ash Council's
deliberations. However, bipartisan support existed in the Senate for some
type of environmental protection administration. In February 1970, the
Republicans, led by Senator Hugh Scott, introduced a bill to establish an
agency with an administrator and three deputy administrators. 40 In April
1970, the Democrats, led by Senator Muskie, introduced a similar bill to
41
establish an agency with an administrator and five deputies.
35. Id; John Muir, A Voice for Wilderness, in Nash, ed, TheAmerican Environment 71-74 (cited in note
34).
36. For readings on this development, see Carol Purcell, ed, From Conservation to Ecology
(Crowell, 1973); Roderick Nash, ed, Environment and Americans (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1972).
37. SeeJ. Clarence Davies III & Barbara S. Davies, The Politics of Pollution 107-08 (Bobbs Merrill,
2d ed 1975). The chapter on public opinion relates how quickly pollution control had become a
major concern. In 1967 most citizens considered it among the least important issues, while in 1970 it
was ranked second only to crime. More than 50% of those polled mentioned that they were worried
about deteriorating air and water quality. Id at 80-102.
38. Marcus, What Does Reorganization Accomplish at 19 (cited in note 29).
39. The Environmental Quality Council was very short-lived. In an effort to head off the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 which set up the Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ') in the White House, Nixon established his own environmental council. Nixon, however,
learned to live with CEQ, and the Environmental Quality Council soon was disbanded. See also
notes 45-46.
40. S 3388, 91st Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 4, 1970).
41. S 3677, 91st Cong, 2d Sess (April 6, 1970). Representative Wydler in the House (HR 16363,
91st Cong, 2d Sess (March 9, 1970) also introduced a bill calling for an environmental protection
agency. His agency did not include sewer grant or pesticides authority.
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Senators Scott and Muskie favored creating an independent agency
designed primarily to deal with pollution problems. At the same time, the
Domestic Council task force informed the Ash Council that it would be most
interested in a proposal to create a new Department of Natural Resources
with a broad environmental quality mission. The question remained whether
the Ash Council would move toward the broader goal of environmental
quality as the task force suggested or toward the more limited notion of a
separate agency that the senators favored.
C.

Bradford, the Environmental Protection Group, and Ash

Former New York Times executive Amory Bradford, the Ash Council staff
coordinator, was committed to holistic thinking and the broad goal of
environmental quality. He favored establishing a Department of the
Environment and Natural Resources that would combine the related functions
of managing energy, mineral, and renewable resources and environmental
protection. 4 2 According to Bradford, such a department was consistent with
the need for a balanced growth policy and with the goals of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"). 4 3 It would also carry out the
44
President's proposal that "the nation develop a national growth policy."

The activities of the new department would conform to the dictates of Section
101(a) of NEPA:
to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
and other requirements of present and
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic,
45
future generations of Americans.

The new department that Bradford favored would work closely with the
Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ') 46 to develop a growth policy that
did not abandon the goal of industrial expansion but changed the emphasis
from growth at any price to a policy more in harmony with the needs of the
47
ecosystem.
42. Marcus, What Does Reorganization Accomplish at 20 (cited in note 29).
43. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub L No 91-190, 83 Stat 852 (1970), codified at
42 USC § 4331. NEPA is reprinted in CEQ The First Annual Report at 243-49 (cited in note 20).
44. Excerpt from the President's State of the Union Address, in CEQ The First Annual Report at
252 (cited in note 20).
45. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101(a), 83 Stat at 852, reprinted in CEQ The
First Annual Report at 244 (cited in note 20).
46. NEPA, signed into law by President Nixon on January i, 1970, created CEQin the Executive
Office of the President. CEQ was supposed to help the President prepare an annual environmental
quality report and establish national policies for improving environmental quality. NEPA required
that all federal actions that significantly affected the environment have environmental impact
statements; CEQ administered this process.
47. The holistic view held by Bradford was not entirely new. The difference between previous
attempts to manage the environment comprehensively and Bradford's proposal was that Bradford
used ecological concepts to justify the need for a national growth policy. The first application of
comprehensive environmental management to natural resource and environmental programs
occurred during the New Deal under the Natural Resources Planning Board. Later, in 1948, the
Hoover Commission called for a reorganization of the Interior Department to achieve
comprehensive management. And, more recently, the Program Planning Budgeting System
("PPBS") introduced by Lyndon Johnson was designed to produce similar comprehensive
management for all government programs. See Richard Polenberg, The New Deal and Administrative

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 54: No. 4

Bradford's desire for comprehensiveness was shared by most of the
experts the Ash Council consulted. In February 1970, the Ash Council
received special assistance from a group of academics convened by the
environmental think-tank Resources for the Future ("RFF"). 48 It consulted
RFF scholars Hans Landsberg, Edwin Haefele, and Allan Kneese, all of whom
had outstanding reputations for innovative studies in the natural resource and
environmental fields. 49 The staff also interviewed private consultants and
other experts in universities.
This expert advice affected the organization of the Ash Council's staff.
Bradford applied the principles of ecology when he divided his aides into
three groups: the Energy and Mineral Resources Group, the Renewable
Resources Group, and the Environmental Protection Group. Ecology
demanded systems thinking instead of ordinary Cartesian logic. 50 Instead of
examining the simple cause and effect relationships between discrete entities,
ecologists examined the complex connections between living and nonliving
matter needed to sustain the ecosystem. The Energy and Minerals Group
concentrated on government programs dealing with power production, water
supply, and substances mined from the soil. The Renewable Resources
Group focused on programs for agriculture, forests, wildlife, and fish. And
the Environmental Protection Group was responsible for waste disposal and
pollution control activities. The five staff members who served on the
Environmental Protection Group were full-time Ash Council employees
Douglas Costle, Victoria Pohle, and Eric Rubin; a White House Fellow in the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"), Wilson Talley; and
51
Princeton political science Professor J. Clarence Davies.
Reform and Keith Henderson, Federal Administrative Reorganization, both in Frank Evans & Harold
Pinkett, eds, Research in the Administration of Public Policy 97-115 (Harvard U Press, 1975).
48. Resources for the Future was created by the Ford Foundation in the early 1950s. In 1953 it
organized the Mid-Century Conference on Resources for the Future, the first major national
conservation conference since Teddy Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot staged the National Governors
Conference in 1908. See Katherine Barkley & Steve Weissman, The Eco-Establishment, in Carol
Purcell, ed, From Conservation to Ecology 123 (Crowell, 1973). In 1964, under the leadership ofJoseph
Fisher, RFF changed its focus from resource sufficiency to environmental quality. See Joseph L.
Fisher, New Directions, in Nash, ed, The American Environment 157-64 (cited in note 34).
49. See Hans H. Landsberg, Natural Resources for U.S. Growth: A Look Ahead to the Year 2000
(Johns Hopkins Press, 1964). Landsberg provided statistics and factual documentation for the
argument that the United States should shift emphasis from resource quantity to environmental
quality. In 1974 Landsberg found himself studying the "no-growth society." See Mancur Olson &
Hans H. Landsberg, eds, The No-Growth Society (W. W. Norton, 1973). See also Edwin T. Haefele,
Representative Government and Environmental Management (Johns Hopkins Press, 1973). See Freeman,
Haveman & Kneese, The Economics of EnvironmentalPolicy (cited in note 6) (providing an excellent nontechnical introduction to environmental policy). For a more technical analysis, see Allen V. Kneese &
Blair T. Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions (Johns Hopkins Press,
1968).
50. For a provocative, popular work on the relationship between ecology and environmental
problems, see Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle 29 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1971). According to
Commoner, "the first law of ecology" is that "everything is connected to everything else." Id at 33.
See also Edward J. Kormondy, Concepts of Ecology (Prentice Hall, 2d ed 1976).
51. See Douglas Costle, The Environmental Protection Agency, Its Origin and Role (unpublished
paper) (copy on file with author). After serving as head of the Connecticut Environmental Protection
Agency, Costle joined the staff of the Congressional Budget Office. In 1977, President Carter
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The Environmental Protection Group did not favor combining pollution
control and natural resource programs. Three ideas-representing a mixture
of expert advice and the principles and values of staff group membersdominated its deliberations. These ideas, discussed in turn below, provided a
rationale for the group's recommendation to consolidate existing pollution
control programs in a separate department.
First, the Group believed that new pollution problems were likely to
develop that would strain the capacity of the fragmented environmental
protection programs then in existence. An upgraded bureaucratic entity
directly linked to the president was needed to anticipate pollution problems
not yet discovered. Although scientists knew pollution was a serious problem,
they did not completely grasp its magnitude. Increases in population,
industrial production, mobility, and urbanization were expected to add to
already serious pollution. Both the ability to monitor environmental hazards
and the ability to detect the risks for the ecosystem were in the infancy of their
development. The full risk of toxic chemicals, for example, only recently had
been detected. 52 Like radiation and pesticides, these poisonous substances
crossed the traditional bureaucratic lines between air, water, and land
pollution. Authority for toxic substances did not belong in NAPCA (HEW),
FWPCA (Department of the Interior), or the pesticides program (Department
of Agriculture). Nor did toxic substance regulation fit with other pollution
programs. As a result, unless a new department or agency with an explicit
pollution control mission were created, the federal government would not
possess the organizational apparatus needed to detect new threats, such as
toxic substances, or to take on new responsibilities for responding to such
threats.
Second, the Environmental Protection Group believed that pollution
control regulation and the promotion of economic development should be
separated to avoid conflicts of interest. 53 Many of the existing departments
and agencies encouraged the growth of sectors of the economy that
contributed to pollution, such as mining, petroleum extraction, nuclear
power, and highway construction. Under the Group's view, the departments
and agencies that stimulated this expansion should not administer a pollution
appointed Costle head of the Environmental Protection Agency. In 1975 Talley became EPA
Assistant Administrator for Research and Development. Davies has served as an RFF scholar and
executive vice president of the Conservation Foundation. He is now an EPA assistant administrator.
52. The CEQ first proposed in 1971 that Congress adopt a toxic substances control act, but no
such legislation was adopted until 1976. The Toxic Substances Control Act enables the government
to control the industries that produce the synthetic organic compounds used to make fibers, plastics,
detergents, pesticides, and other products. It also permits regulation of such substances as asbestos
and mercury as well as vinyl chloride, polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCB's"), and polybrominated
biphenyls ("PBB's"). Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub L No 94-469, 90 Stat 2003 (1976), codified
at 15 USC § 2601; see also Office of Toxic Substances, EPA, A Framework for the Control of Toxic
Substances (April 1975) (a compilation of speeches).
53. A distinction can be drawn between the regulatory function and the promotion function of
government. Merle Fainsod, Lincoln Gordon & Joseph C. Palamountain, Jr., Government and the
American Economy 81-109, 221-36 (W. W. Norton, revised ed 1948). See also James Q. Wilson, The
Rise of the Bureaucratic State, The Public Interest 77-103 (1975).
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control program; rather, bureaucracies encouraging "exploitation" of the
environment should be separated from those that were responsible for
environmental protection. More specifically, conflict that existed in the past
between resource development and pollution control should now be resolved
in favor of environmental protection. If pollution control programs, for
example, were combined with natural resource programs in a revitalized
Department of the Interior, then the environmentalists would be
overwhelmed by the better organized developers. The fox, as the staff put it,
had to be kept out of the chicken coop; otherwise, the few who suffered the
concentrated costs of environmental regulation were likely to prevail over the
many who stood to gain the diffuse benefits of regulation. The promoters of
economic development, represented by several departments, bureaus, and
agencies in the federal structure, already outnumbered antipollution forces,
which had no official representative. Fairness dictated that those favoring
environmental protection also should have a structure within the federal
54
bureaucracy supporting their concerns.
Third, the Group believed that an integrated and systematic method had
to be applied to the problem of managing the unwanted by-products of an
affluent society. The concept of residuals management would have the
government control as efficiently as possible the total quantity of wastes
produced, regardless of the source, media, or form. Accordingly, it was
necessary to reduce the amount of wastes generated, to recycle and reuse as
much waste as possible, and to find a satisfactory method to dispose of wastes
leftover. It was also necessary to study the interactions among different
pollutants and different forms of pollution in order to base regulation
standards on the total amount of pollution to which humans and the
environment were exposed. An intellectual approach that recognized the
inter-changeability of the different forms of pollution-air, water, and landwould prevent polluters from evading the law by converting wastes from one
form of pollution to another. Such an approach would simplify matters for
industries generating more than one kind of pollution, and it would
encourage the consolidation of state, local, and regional pollution control
agencies. Combining the different antipollution programs would also provide
the benefit of comprehensive planning. If planning took place, new pollution
problems would be less likely to develop in the process of controlling old
ones.

54. Harold Seidman, who served as a consultant for the Ash Council, is an advocate of a
"competitive approach" to bureaucratic reform. Under this approach, competing interests should be
included within the administrative structure of the federal government so that no powerful segment
of society is either excluded from participation or from gaining an equitable share of the benefits.
See Harold Seidman, Politics, Position and Power 3-37, 271-87 (Oxford U Press, 1970).
An advocate of a similar competitive approach is Robert Levine of RAND who writes that
"bureaucratic operations can be made more effective through competition, and competition can be
promoted within a bureaucracy by the frequent creation of the new to challenge the old." Robert A.
Levine, Public Planning: Failure and Redirection 160 (Basic Books, 1972).
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The Environmental Protection Group disagreed with Bradford's proposal
to create a Department of the Environment and Natural Resources. It
considered the task of implementing a national growth policy to be beyond
the means of the proposed department. Decisions about growth involved
more factors than the simple trade-off between resource development and
environmental protection. Moreover, if pollution control and natural
resource functions were consolidated in one department, other government
programs that had an impact on the rate of growth would still remain outside
such a department's control.
Another reason why the Environmental Protection Group objected to the
proposal for a large, amalgamated department was their concern, as described
in Part IV, that the better organized and financed natural resource interests
would tend to prevail over the less well-organized and poorer
environmentalists. Combining the promotion of resource development with
pollution control regulation would build a permanent conflict of interest into
the department, which the Secretary would have to resolve. Should strict
antipollution standards be established, for instance, even if they would
prevent the growth of mining, the spread of nuclear power, and the greater
use of coal for electric power? The Environmental Protection Group felt that
such conflicts of interests would not afflict the head of an environmental
protection administration, who would be a single-minded advocate of
pollution control.
The Environmental Protection Group doubted that incorporating so many
diverse bureaucratic units in one department was politically feasible. For
instance, it was believed unlikely that the Forest Service could be broken away
from the Department of Agriculture; that the Atomic Energy Commission
("AEC") would be willing to give up its independent status; and that the Army
Corps of Engineers could be unhinged from the Department of Defense.
Neither the congressional committees that had oversight and appropriations
responsibility for such bureaucracies nor the constituencies that the existing
programs served would permit such broad departmental reform. The more
limited task of combining pollution control activities in one administration
was in itself difficult to achieve. It would prove even more difficult to
undertake the transfer of the well-entrenched natural resource bureaus and
commissions to a new department.
The Environmental Protection Group also argued against a Department of
the Environment and Natural Resources on the ground that it would be a
holding company too large and diverse to be effectively managed. Even after
uniting the numerous resource and environmental programs into a single
department, the programs would likely remain isolated. The programs'
administrators would pursue separate goals without effective control or
coordination over program activities by the Secretary. In contrast, a separate
environmental protection administration might be able to merge and not just
consolidate pollution control programs. It could break down old bureaucratic
distinctions by organizing on the basis of function-research, standard
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setting, monitoring, enforcement, and state assistance-rather than on the
basis of media-air, water, and land.
Amory Bradford ultimately accepted the Environmental Protection
Group's arguments against a large amalgamated department. In his
recommendation to Ash in March, he maintained that the merger of pollution
control programs deserved first priority. The second priority was establishing
a Department of Natural Resources that would unite renewable resource and
energy and mineral programs.
In April, however, Ash rejected Bradford's recommendations. Ash's first
choice was to bring together related natural resource and environmental
functions in a Department of Natural Resources and the Environment. Ash
chose this alternative because his grand design for the entire federal structure
was to consolidate departments and reduce the number of officials reporting
directly to the President. The premise of Ash's theory of reorganization was
that competing interests should be united. Ash wanted to reduce the size of
the cabinet and establish four super-departments-for community
development, economic affairs, human resources, and natural resources-to
rearrange and combine the various programs in HUD, HEW, Transportation,
Interior, Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce. 5 5 Because officials in these new
departments would need to balance opposing interests, they would less likely
be advocates of narrow points of view. Strong, loyal cabinet and sub-cabinet
officials-carefully selected by the President-would manage the day-to-day
operations of domestic programs. In turn, the Executive Office of the
President would no longer be burdened with balancing competing interests.
With fewer officials reporting directly to the White House, the President
would be both significantly relieved of daily operating responsibilities and in
greater control over the bureaucracy.
In this round, at least, Ash had the final say. Despite the objections of the
Environmental Protection Group and their persuasion of Bradford, Ash's view
prevailed. The proposed Department of Natural Resources and the
Environment would consolidate such elements as the various pollution
control programs, the AEC, the Forest Service, the Army Corps of Engineers,
and the Department of the Interior. So consolidated, the new department
would have been the fifth largest in the federal government.
D.

Departmental Opposition

One day after Ash made his recommendation, the Ash Council met with
the secretaries of various departments and the heads of CEQand AEC to hear
their comments. HEW Secretary Finch was opposed to any reorganization of
the nation's environmental and natural resource programs. Secretaries Stans
from Commerce, Hardin from Agriculture, Romney from HUD, and AEC
administrator Seaborg also opposed the plan. They were against
55. Richard P. Nathan, The Administrative Presidency, The Public Interest 42-45 (Summer 1976).
See also Richard P. Nathan, The Plot That Failed: Nixon and the Administration Presidency 59-62 (John
Wiley & Sons, 1975).
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reorganization because they stood to lose appropriations, personnel, and
statutory responsibility. The chairman of CEQ, Russell Train, opposed
establishing a super-department, but he favored creating separate pollution
control and natural resource bureaucracies. Only Secretary Hickel of the
Department of the Interior, which would be transformed the most, and
Secretary Volpe of the Department of Transportation, which would be
changed the least, supported Ash's recommendation.
HEW maintained that the proponents of reorganization should
demonstrate that the long-term benefits of reorganization would outweigh its
immediate costs. Transferring programs would disrupt their operations.
Bureaucratic infighting and administrative concerns would consume time
otherwise devoted to program administration during the period of transition.
Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans discussed the problems of
integration that he thought were associated with Ash's proposal. Mining,
coal, and gas interests would try to prevent the consolidation of energy
programs. Coordination of the different pollution control programs would be
difficult since these programs had separate statutes, goals, and professional
constituencies. On the one hand, the laws defined air pollution as a health
problem, and air pollution regulation depended upon the research on health
effects of medical scientists in the Public Health Service. On the other hand,
the laws defined water pollution as a recreation problem, and sanitation
engineers applied their expertise to the construction of sewage waste
treatment plants that made waterways more fishable and swimmable.
Different programs-granted authority by separate statutes, surrounded by
diverse interests, and using different professional groups for
implementation-would not be effectively consolidated or coordinated if
56
housed in a single department.

Stans also doubted the feasibility of the overall goal underlying Ash's
reorganization plan for the federal bureaucracy: greater control by the
President. Presidentially appointed cabinet and sub-cabinet officials of a
super-department of natural resources would be in no position to control dayto-day operations of environmental regulation. To the extent that control
over the bureaucracy was necessary, the President could best achieve it
through the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and the Domestic
57
Council in the Executive Office.

The secretaries of Agriculture and HUD and the chairmen of AEC and
CEQhad equally strong reservations about the feasibility and appropriateness
of Ash's proposal. Agriculture Secretary Hardin mentioned that the wellorganized farm and chemical industries would oppose a switch in
responsibility for pesticide regulation. HUD Secretary Romney noted that
city governments and their urban poor constituents, many of whom were
black, would not be pleased since they would interpret the creation of a
56.
57.

Marcus, Promise and Performance at 40-41 (cited in note 28).
Id.
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natural resources conglomerate as an indication that the federal government
was abandoning their problems. AEC Chairman Seaborg claimed that his
commission should not lose the right to set emissions standards because it
needed this regulatory authority to carry out its nuclear power plant licensing
function. Finally, CEQ Chairman Russell Train repeated some of the
Environmental Protection Group's criticisms, for example, that uniting
regulators with polluters in the same department would create conflicts of
interest.
Secretary Hickel--one of the two supporters of Ash's proposalemphasized the need for a balanced growth policy. His support for the
proposal, however, probably did more to discredit it in the eyes of Roy Ash
and the White House than to further its progress. Among Nixon's
supporters, Hickel was looked upon with disfavor because he had
enthusiastically endorsed Earth Day and publicly criticized the President's
environmental record.
The consequence of so much departmental opposition was a stalemate.
Ash's proposal to create a super-department did not have enough support
from the cabinet members whose departments it affected. The turning point
came when HEW modified its stance. In a discussion paper sent to the Ash
Council, HEW indicated a willingness to support the creation of an
independent pollution control administration. Ideally, the paper argued, all
environmental programs should be housed in HEW because they were public
health programs. Doctors acknowledged that certain diseases were linked to
environmental causes and that more research on health effects was needed. 58
The drawback to placing all pollution control programs in HEW, however,
was the enormous size of the department. Lacking visibility in such a large
department, environmental programs would suffer when competing for funds
against other programs.
The Environmental Protection Group, Bradford, CEQ, and now HEW
favored separating pollution control from natural resource activities. All of
these parties were thinking' along the same lines, while those who were
inclined to support a larger conglomerate had different reasons for doing so.
The Domestic Council task force, Bradford (before he changed his opinion),
and now Hickel saw the united department as a tool to implement a balanced
national growth policy; Ash's purpose was to streamline the bureaucracy for
more effective presidential management. Ultimately Ash withdrew his
opposition to the staff proposal for a pollution control department that he
previously had rejected.
In a memorandum to the President in late April, the Ash Council
advocated merging key antipollution programs into a separate department or
agency. In May, a second memorandum was sent to the White House that
proposed establishing a Department of Natural Resources that would
combine renewable and non-renewable resource programs. However, the
58.

See Ren6 Dobus. Mlan Adapting 163-253 (Yale U Press, 1980).
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memorandum openly doubted the political feasibility of this plan because of
opposition from AEC, the Corps of Engineers, the Department- of
Agriculture, and others.
The Environmental Protection Group insisted on a separate pollution
control department and, despite the counterproposal of the Domestic Council
task force, the initial opposition of Amory Bradford, the opposing theory of
Roy Ash, and the resistance of departments and agencies, its view reached the
President. One reason that the plan for a separate pollution control
administration moved successfully through such a political obstacle course
was that it stood between extremes. On the one hand, the Domestic Council
task force, Bradford, and Ash favored consolidating all natural resource and
pollution control programs. On the other hand, the Departments of HEW,
Commerce, Agriculture, HUD, and the AEC-fearing that they would lose
authority, resources, or personnel-saw no reason for such a large-scale
transformation. While originally only a few influential senators favored an
independent pollution control agency, in the end, Bradford, CEQ, and HEW,
saw it as a compromise proposal and, as such, consented to support it.
E.

The President: Idealism Tempered

In the final reorganization plans submitted to Congress in July 1970,
President Nixon made certain adjustments to the Ash Council
recommendations. He appeased the dissenting cabinet members by
maintaining programs they considered necessary to their departmental
missions. The existing departments and AEC did not suffer as large a loss of
personnel, resources, and authority as would have occurred under the Ash
Council recommendations. Moreover, the President supported the notion
that OMB and the Domestic Council, not CEQ, would resolve disputes
between EPA and the other departments and agencies. The final credit for
submitting the plan to create EPA to Congress belongs to President Nixon.
Although there was some quibbling from Congress, the proposal to create
a new pollution control department was never in serious danger of rejection.
Nixon cited the need to merge pollution control functions as the reason for
creating the new agency:
Despite its complexity, for pollution control purposes the environment must be
A single source may pollute the air with
perceived as a single interrelated system ....
smoke and chemicals, the land with solid wastes, and a river or lake with chemical and
other wastes. Control of the air pollution may produce more solid wastes which then
pollute the land or water. Control of the water polluting effluent may convert it into
solid wastes, which must be disposed of on land ....

A far more effective approach to

pollution would:
-

Identify pollutants;

-

Trace them through the entire ecological chain, observing and recording
changes in form as they occur;
Determine the total exposure of man and his environment;
Examine interactions among forms of pollution; and

-
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IV
THE FUNCTIONAL PLAN

EPA's first administrator, William Ruckelshaus, had a number of priorities
when he took over the agency. 60 He wanted to create a well-defined

enforcement image, to carry out scrupulously the provisions of the 1970
Clean Air Act, and to gain control over the regulatory decisionmaking
process. He was also concerned with organizational matters and tried to
structure the agency according to the Ash Council's plan for comprehensive
environmental management. He attempted to implement the plan by
systematically integrating the bureaucratic components he received from
various agencies and departments. However, his efforts met with more
resistance than his other initiatives in the areas of image-building,
implementation, and control, and in the end were not very successful.
A.

The Administrator's Priorities

Administrator Ruckelshaus's priorities were a product of demands he
faced during EPA's first six months. Ruckelshaus had to demonstrate to
environmentalists that EPA-unlike former pollution control bureaus-would
be willing to take polluters to court. The Clean Air Act compelled him to
issue national air quality goals. The White House pressured him to improve
the agency's capabilities for analyzing the costs and benefits of its actions.
Establishing priorities for the new agency was not a planned or orderly
procedure. It was subject to constraints that limited Ruckelshaus's ability to
act independently and to implement a structural plan for comprehensive
management. Ruckelshaus compared the experience to "running a 100-yard
61
dash, while undergoing an appendectomy."Ruckelshaus could not command events or master the situation he faced.
Rather, he coped with issues as they arose and responded to what he
considered to be the demands of the moment. He struggled to find solutions
that would accommodate conflicting interests and spent endless time and
energy trying to persuade others to support the agency's activities. Moreover,
despite some commitment to CEM, Ruckelshaus never fully embraced the Ash
Council's top priority-organizing EPA according to the functional plan for
CEM. Ruckelshaus could not decide whether to organize the agency strictly
according to functional categories such as research, planning and
management, standards, and compliance, or according to environmental
59. CEQ The First Annual Report at 294-305 (cited in note 20).
60. For readings on executive behavior, see Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive
(Harvard U Press, 1968); Phillip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation
(Harper & Row, 1957); Marver Bernstein, The Job of the Federal Executive (Brookings Inst, 1956);
Seidman, Politics, Position and Power (cited in note 54).
61. John Quarles, Cleaning Up America 32 (Houghton Mifflin, 1976).
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program areas focusing on different forms of pollution such as air, water,
pesticides, and solid wastes. Instead of choosing one type of organizational
framework, Ruckelshaus developed hybrid structures that incorporated
elements of both the functional and the form-of-pollution organizational
methods. Essentially he divided the agency's units in half-some assistant
administrators had functional responsibilities and some had programmatic
responsibilities.
There were a number of reasons why Ruckelshaus failed to organize the
agency completely along functional lines. He considered structural features
to be less important to the agency's effectiveness; consequently, other
decisions regarding key personnel appointments, for example, or the banning
of DDT and chemical detergents took precedence over structural issues.
Moreover, in order to maintain the confidence of the inherited bureaucracy,
he thought it best to avoid the disruption of its routines that would result
from program integration. A disruption of standard operating procedures
would have jeopardized EPA's success in meeting its statutory responsibilities
by the prescribed deadlines. Disruption might also have led to dissension in
the bureaucracy and to complaints to Muskie's subcommittee. These
complaints would have blamed Nixon's appointees for the delays because they
had insisted on program consolidation. Thus, because he wanted to assure
bureaucratic confidence and because he had to deal with more pressing
matters, Ruckelshaus failed to carry out the full functional plan.
B.

The Origins of the Functional Plan

The origins of the functional plan date back to the period before EPA's
creation, when Alain Enthoven, in the role of consultant, and Douglas Costle,
in the role of task force coordinator, helped devise EPA's organizational
strategy. Enthoven, a former Defense Department official, composed a
functional plan that appeared in October 1970. It incorporated ideas that the
Ash Council staff had been developing, which appealed to Enthoven because
they applied the Defense Department's program planning experiments to
EPA's organizational design. 6 2 Just as Defense Department budget categories
were broken down into functional units (such as strategic retaliation, general
purpose, and air defense), EPA's organizational division also could be broken
down according to functional units (such as abatement, monitoring, research,
and standard setting). Like the Defense Department, EPA could adopt
mission-based categories to break down artificial bureaucratic distinctions,
eliminate duplication and waste, and achieve greater integration of
operations. Enthoven argued forcefully for eliminating EPA's programmatic
inheritance: its distinct air pollution control, water quality, solid waste,
radiation, and pesticide components. EPA, according to Enthoven, should
carry out President Nixon's expressed intent by dealing with the environment
62. See Alain C. Enthoven & K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program
1961-1969, 31-73 (Harper & Row, 1971).
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as an interrelated system. Abatement programs should not be evaluated on
the basis of their effects on a single medium such as the air, water, or land.
Douglas Costle, head of the Ash Council's environmental protection
group, directed a White House EPA task force that handled transitional
issues. While still engaged in Ash Council deliberations, Costle had favored
complete functionalization. He helped develop the concept of comprehensive
waste management that Nixon used in his "Message Relative to the
Reorganization," and he promoted the idea that pollution problems were
interrelated. One of Costle's first undertakings as coordinator of the EPA task
force was to prepare an "inventory" of EPA's inherited bureaucracies and
programs. The results of this inventory reinforced his conviction that EPA's
diverse holdings had to be integrated.
The inventory writers listed the bureaucratic pieces that EPA would be
63
receiving, their budgets, work forces, cohesiveness, and statutory authority.
A summary of their findings is helpful in understanding why Costle stressed
functionalization. EPA's largest bureaucratic piece, the Fresh Water Quality
Administration ("FWQA"), had been separated from the Bureau of Water
Hygiene ("BWH") when it was moved out of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare by President Johnson in 1967. 64 FWQA had a large
budget but was obligated to spend 90 percent of it on sewage waste
construction grants. BWH's water program monitored drinking water quality,
but it had no enforcement powers. Air pollution control, EPA's second
65
largest program, had a "research-first" image.
The inventory writers, however, reserved most of their criticism for the
pesticides, radiation, and solid waste programs. With respect to the pesticides
program, they were concerned that a diversity of purposes could impede
progress. The Pesticides Registration Division from the Department of
Agriculture tested the efficacy of insect killers; the division inherited from the
Department of Interior examined the effects of these substances on fish and
wildlife; and the Pesticides Research Office from the Food and Drug
Administration researched human tolerance to pesticides. A lack of
enforcement authority could also impede progress because the right to
remove food contaminated with pesticides from the market remained with the
FDA. A similar lack of enforcement authority was likely to impede radiation
control progress. EPA could establish emission limits, but enforcement
power rested with the Atomic Energy Commission, which licensed atomic
power plants. The inventory writers further noted that EPA inherited a
relatively small solid waste program. 66 In comparison to the other programs,
the solid waste program had few employees, a small budget, and little
63.
in CEQ
64.
1971).
65.
66.

Message of the President Relative to Reorganization Plans Nos 3 & 4 of 1970, July 9, 1970,
The First Annual Report at 295-98 (cited in note 20).
See Water Quality and the Interior Department: An Aborted Experiment (Nati Acad Pub Admin,
Esposito, Vanishing Air at 182 (cited in note 17).
Marcus, 1lhat Does Reorganization Accomplish at 121 (cited in note 29).
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statutory authority. Even though the 1970 Resources Recovery Act 6 7
authorized spending $460 million over three years on waste recycling
research, the solid waste program was EPA's least significant inheritance. A
lack of cohesion, enforcement authority, money, and personnel limited the
capability of the program.
These factors convinced Costle that EPA's bureaucratic pieces should be
molded into an agency with a comprehensive pollution control identity. EPA
could not afford to become a big holding company like HEW or the
Department of the Interior. The secretaries of those departments had little
power over independent units that had independent constituencies and
congressional relations. EPA needed strong management from the top.
Costle felt that its organizational structure should conform to the pattern
found in the Department of Defense, NASA, and AEC.
However, in deciding how to devise an organizational strategy for EPA,
Costle balanced the need for integration with the need to get a rapid start in
dealing with the problems EPA expected to handle. He feared that by crosscutting the categorical programs, pulling them apart, and assigning personnel
by function, the new administrator would create chaos. Work would come to
a halt, and the ensuing confusion would paralyze the agency's efforts. If the
full functional scheme were put into effect, the agency would not be able to
carry out more pressing responsibilities, such as banning chemicals, preparing
a budget, developing legislative proposals, and bringing violators to court.
C.

The Three-Stage Strategy

Costle concluded that although a functional organization was the
appropriate long-term goal for the agency, only incremental change was
reasonable and feasible in the short run. The message conveyed to
Ruckelshaus at the initial briefing on organization and management options
was that, at first, EPA should maintain the continuity of program identity
necessary to achieve immediate objectives. The administrator should lay only
the groundwork for implementing the full functional scheme at this time. In a
follow-up period, Ruckelshaus would be able to overcome the limitations of
the holding company model and ensure comprehensive environmental
management.
68
Costle recommended a three-stage strategy for organizational change.
The initial structure of the agency would preserve the five program areas as
illustrated in Figure 1.69 The two assistant administrators would be part of
the administrator's staff and would have no responsibility for operations.
After a period of time, the agency would move closer to the functional ideal.
67. Resource Recovery Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-512, 84 Stat 1227 (October 26, 1970). See
Mills, Design for Environmental Protection at 18 (cited in note 27); Rosenbaun, The Politics of
Environmental Concern at 247-49 (cited in note 12).
68. See William R. Ahern, Jr., Organizing for Pollution Control.- The Beginning of the Environmental
Protection Agency. 1970-71, 29-34 (JFK School of Govt, 1973).
69. Marcus, What Does Reorganization Accomplish at 123 (cited in note 29).
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Costle imagined that the agency's second organizational chart would look like
Figure 2.70 This structure would put greater distance between the
administrator and the three assistant administrators' offices that would begin
to take over the functional administration of the programs. Finally, after
more time had elapsed, the agency would work toward complete
functionalization. Costle imagined that the final organizational chart would
look like Figure 3.71 The final organization would give priority to five
functions: (1) planning and management; (2) standards and compliance; (3)
regional programs; (4) national programs; and (5) research and monitoring.
It would encourage a systems approach to environmental management and
increase executive control by eliminating old organizational identities.
FIGURE
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Ruckelshaus's Response

Ruckelshaus, while making slight modifications, essentially carried out the
first two parts of Costle's three-stage plan. At the start of his tenure, he set up
a system in which commissioners administered discrete EPA programs. For
the time being, his purpose was to continue with important existing activities,
while creating a more effective organization later.7 2 The commissioner
70. Id.
71.
Idat 124.
72. Ahern, Organizing for Pollution Control (cited in note 68); see also Robert Gillette,
Environmental Protection Agenv: Chaos or Creative Tension?, 173 Science 703-07 (Aug 20, 1971); Richard
Corrigan, Agency Report/EP. Ending Year-Long Shakedown Cruise, Natl J Rep 2039-47 (Oct 9, 1971).

Page 5: Autumn 1991]

EPA's

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

FIGURE

2
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FINAL ORGANIZATIONAL CHART (COSTLE)
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system, Ruckelshaus said, would be temporary. In time, the agency would
move toward a different structure.
Figure 473 illustrates the agency structure under the commissioner system
that Ruckelshaus approved in December 1970. In addition to the five
commissioners, the original plan provided for three assistant administrators
for Planning and Management, Standards and Enforcement and General
Counsel, and Research and Monitoring. These assistant administrators would
operate more as staff to the administrator than as managers with large
operating bureaucracies under their direction. Two other assistant
administrators had been assigned to the agency, but their duties were still
uncertain. Ruckelshaus added an assistant administrator for field
coordination to Costle's initial scheme as a temporary position in order to
FIGURE

4

COMMISSIONER SYSTEM STRUCTURE (RUCKELSHAUS)
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Marcus, What Does Reorganization Accomplish at 125 (cited in note 29).

Commissioner
of Solid Waste
Management

Page 5: Autumn 1991]

EPA's

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

FIGURE
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SECOND ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN (RUCKELSHAUS)
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obtain a better understanding of the agency's regional operations. Unlike
Costle, Ruckelshaus combined the general counsel's duties with the standards
and enforcement function and gave this position assistant administrator status
as a way to emphasize EPA's intention to bring pollution control violators to
court.
Five months later Ruckelshaus drew up a second organizational plan
illustrated by Figure 5.74 This structure basically corresponded to the second
stage envisioned by Costle, except for the media office, which combined the
air and water programs. The media office was meant to establish methods of
communication where none previously existed. Ruckelshaus hoped that the
interaction among previously separate elements would generate new ideas.
Although Ruckelshaus carried out the first two stages of the plan, he failed
to push the agency to stage three and a complete functional scheme; the
program offices survived and maintained their distinct identities. Why was
functionalization not completed? In part, Ruckelshaus shied away from
functionalization because he felt that structure was not as important as
personnel. Having worked all his life with lawyers in a collegial environment,
he had no experience managing a hierarchical agency. He did not feel that he
understood the jargon used by his organizational advisors and the meaning of
the charts they brought to him. He believed that the success of an

74.

Id at 126.
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organizational scheme depended upon getting key people to make it work,
75
and that there was no magic in any particular structure.
Another reason that Ruckelshaus did not completely functionalize the
agency was his fear of mutiny on the part of the inherited bureaucracy.
Inherited personnel might not have adjusted to complete functionalization;
morale would have suffered, and the agency would have been paralyzed.
Alienated bureaucrats might have complained to Congress, where they were
likely to find a receptive audience. Senators and representatives themselves
would have been confused by an organization that eliminated programmatic
distinctions tied to existing committees. Ruckelshaus believed that the
inherited programs had to maintain continuity to avoid the prospect of
congressional criticism; as a result, he did not fully implement the functional
plan.
Thus the concept of comprehensive management that began with slogans
such as "spaceship earth" and "eco-balance" was tempered by the politics of
reorganization and further weakened when the functional plan was not fully
adopted. The President's message promised that the new agency would
eliminate artificial distinctions between media, 76 but EPA's organizational
scheme maintained these distinctions. The message advocated systematic
management by which pollutants would be traced through the entire
ecological chain, their interactions examined, and the total exposure of man
and the environment determined; but an organization that conducted specific
programs in the fields of air pollution, water quality, solid wastes, radiation,
and pesticides could not carry out such systematic management.
V
THE LIMITATIONS OF COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT

The Ash Council's staff set noble goals for the new EPA:
managing
pollution in a way that reflected the interrelatedness of the environment,
preventing unintended environmental side effects, and achieving a balanced
rate of growth. However, for the first twenty years of EPA's existence, these

goals remained unattainable as the narrow perspectives of bureaucrats
worked against achieving such broad principles. Program managers were tied
to specific laws, functions, and appropriations that perpetuated longstanding
pollution control distinctions. Regional administrators had local connections
and enough independence not to act in concert with Washington.
Consequently, EPA remained in many respects a coalition of small fiefdomsseparate programs, regional offices, and administrative staffs. On a more
basic level, EPA lacked rudimentary information about how the environment
functions and the concrete effects of pollution. This knowledge gap hindered
75.
72).
76.

Corrigan, NatlJ Rep at 2043 (cited in note 72); Gillette, 173 Science at 705 (cited in note
See note 22 and accompanying text.
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the agency in its attempt to control environmental degradation and protect
human health. Moreover, the administrator's staff dealt with immediate
problems, lacking time to consider broad policy options and goals. The
agency also was unable to develop a measure for total environmental
progress; nor did it have the information to assess which problems deserved
first claim on its resources.
A.

Structural Limits Within EPA

Presidents, professional reformers, and social scientists could afford to
discuss the environment in terms of comprehensive principles, because they
were detached from the day-to-day responsibility for specific programs.
EPA's bureaucrats, in contrast, could not deliberate about the largest possible
range of environmental phenomena and concerns. Their position in EPA's
structure and their delegated tasks limited their view of environmental
problems. Policymakers assumed that the environment could be perceived
from a broad uniform perspective, such as in the metaphors of spaceship
earth or in the concepts of the material balance model, but they did not take
into account that bureaucrats in EPA viewed specific environmental problems
from a variety of narrow vantage points.
This section attempts to explain why the bureaucrats-divided by legal,
regional, and professional differences-did not implement the systematic
notions underlying CEM entertained by policymakers at the time of EPA's
organization. It examines the principles of comprehensive management from
the perspective of different parts of the bureaucracy-program managers,
regional administrators and the states, the administrator's staff, and EPA's
research apparatus-and shows why the reorganization did not succeed in
achieving CEM.
1. Program Managers. Barriers to the implementation of CEM existed at the
highest levels of the agency. Program managers, the highest ranking
Washington-based civil servants, saw no compelling reason to eliminate the
former categories of pollution control. EPA's programs came from large
departments (HEW, Interior, and Agriculture) where program managers
enjoyed substantial autonomy. EPA's managers were inclined to believe that
the agency should have been a pure holding company with five separate
subsidiaries addressing the distinct pollution problems of air, water,
pesticides, radiation and noise, and solid wastes. Since these managers
believed that pollution rarely crossed program lines, they expected that the
agency could solve these exceptional cases as they arose.
Program managers also had personal interests in maintaining the status
quo and keeping programs separate. Many of them had worked in their
particular fields for twenty years or more and had carved out very specific
areas of expertise. Managers resisted major change because they had invested
time and effort in existing policy and procedure. They felt comfortable with
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the established decisionmaking process and operating procedures, which they
felt incorporated the wisdom of experience.
Finally, program managers resisted the elimination of pollution control
distinctions because they approached their jobs in terms of the separate
statutory requirements they had to fulfill. They responded to a series of
pollution control laws enacted by Congress, not to the President's declaration
of comprehensiveness. While the President asked for structural reform, he
did not propose that Congress pass an environmental bill that would require
the new agency to pursue a comprehensive method.
Instead, EPA had to administer separate air, water, pesticide, noise, solid
waste, and radiation acts. These statutes reflected the fragmented nature of
the legislative branch where eight House committees, seven Senate
committees, and one joint committee each had some jurisdiction over
pollution control. The result was a perpetuation of old loyalties and
communication patterns among EPA's programs.
Congress did not have the will to reorganize its fragmented committee
structure or the foresight to change the piecemeal way in which it considered
pollution problems. Legislation and committee jurisdiction continued to be
based on the narrowly defined separation between programs. Congress
deliberated on each law separately and amended them according to legal and
political concepts that were not compatible with a comprehensive, but more
77
functional plan.

EPA did attempt to organize part of its bureaucracy according to
comprehensive management principles, but Congress's fragmented approach
to pollution control blocked its efforts. For example, two of EPA's largest and
best-funded programs, which dealt with air and water quality, were for a time
placed under a single assistant administrator in the media office. Yet, each
program had a distinct conceptual basis and statutory and procedural
mandate. 78 For instance, the air pollution program focused primarily on the
long-term hazard to human health, while the water pollution program's major
concern was removing organic material from waterways. The two programs
were eventually separated.
A comprehensive environmental protection act would have given EPA a
single mission such as protection of human life and environment. Instead of
separate enforcement agents for air and water pollution, a single enforcement

officer would have been responsible for all the pollution a plant generated. If
uniform provisions had applied to different media and forms of pollution,
77. For detailed information on EPA's legal authorities, see EPA, Legal Compilation: Statutes and
Legislative History, Executive Orders, Regulations, and Guidelines and Reports (US Govt Printing Office,
1973). A good summary of EPA's statutes (pre-1972) is provided by The Challenge of the Environment:
A Primer on EPA's Statutory Authority (EPA, 1972).
78. See Water Quality Strategy Paper (EPA, 1975); Air Program Policy Statement (EPA, 1974).
According to the Clean Air Act, air quality goals were based on health and welfare criteria; according
to the water pollution act, discharge limitations were based on technological and economic
considerations. The national air pollution office established quality goals while the states set
discharge limitations. The national water pollution office set discharge limitations, while the states
established quality goals.
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administration would have been simpler and perhaps would have proceeded
more smoothly. Unfortunately, Congress did not view the environment as a
single interrelated system, and program managers had to fulfill statutory
79
obligations that were not compatible with implementing CEM.
2. The States and Regional Administrators. The states and regional
administrators represented another institutional barrier to a functional plan.
In order to implement a comprehensive national environmental policy, EPA
needed the ability to manage the pollution control programs and the groups
carrying out national environmental policy. However, the air and water
pollution control legislation passed by Congress demanded extensive state
participation. Consequently, the agency was dependent on the states for
performance of crucial activities.
For example, the ambient air quality standards established in Washington
were to be implemented at the state level. The federal government stepped in
only if the states could not or would not implement them. Also, state water
quality programs continued to operate, the states distributed water
construction grants, and the 1972 water amendments gave the states the right
to administer .their own permit programs provided they fulfilled regional
guidelines. 8 0 The White House philosophy favoring decentralization
provided further incentive to this sharing of power between the states and the
federal government."'
To manage this delegation of power to the states, EPA set up regional
offices. 8 2 Unfortunately, this attempt to control state action created problems
of its own. The regional administrators perceived issues not only in terms of
their own obligations to headquarters, but also in terms of their commitments
to the states. In fact, if a regional administrator became aligned with the
states' interests he or she could block decisive agency action by refusing to
carry out national policy. 13 Headquarters could do little to coerce a regional
administrator to change his or her ways, because, once appointed, a regional
administrator quickly became entrenched. EPA in Washington could risk
firing a regional administrator only if it was willing to alienate his or her local
supporters.
Efforts by EPA to gain greater control over the regional offices met with
limited success. Headquarters tried setting up the Management By Objectives
79. This failure on the part of Congress reflects, however, that in most instances, the American
government is too divided to deal comprehensively with issues. Separate branches, a federal
structure, and constitutionally mandated checks and balances impede efforts to develop integrative
principles and to deal broadly with problems. Ordinarily, when conflicting interests have equal
rights and separate units of government have different responsibilities, ends are not clearly
articulated, means carefully chosen, or plans vigorously pursued.
80. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-500, 86 Stat 816,
codified at 33 USC § 1251(b) (1988).
81. See Report of the Decentralization Task Force (EPA, Dec 1975).
82. For a history and evaluation of EPA's regional offices, see Regional Organization (EPA Office
of Planning and Management).
83. See Steven M. Lierberman, State and Regional Perspectives on the Environmental Protection "Senice
Delivery, System" (Comm Envir Decision Making, 1976).
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("MBO") system by sending each region a manual that stated national
objectives and listed priorities,8 4 and by allocating resources on the basis of a
region attaining its goals of meeting specified outputs.

85

The regions and

states became committed to precise quantities of these outputs, which were
the bases for their yearly work plans.
The MBO system, however, turned out to be ineffective for implementing
CEM. The regions, in order to reach their commitments, tended to perform
the easiest outputs first, not the outputs that would most benefit the overall
environment. Consequently, it was impossible to judge whether the output
numbers requested by headquarters actually contributed to overall
environmental progress. A region might achieve all the expected numerical
goals and still not improve or even maintain the quality of the total
environment. Thus, while the MBO system gave headquarters some control
over the regions, it did not give EPA enough control to assure the effective
concerted action needed to implement comprehensive environmental
principals.
3. The Administrator's Staff. The administrator's staff was unable to consider
broad policy options and goals because it had to cope with changing political
and economic circumstances. In 1970, the agency faced public pressure to
regulate without regard for cost. The national consensus in favor of
environmental action, however, quickly dissolved with the appearance of the
economic downturn and the energy crisis of the early 1970s. In fact, relations
with the White House eventually became strained because EPA was not
paying enough attention to economic issues.
Therefore, the administrator's staff tried to make sure that every
regulation underwent sound economic analysis and struck the proper balance
between environmental and economic concerns. 86 EPA also examined the
effect of each regulation on both the targeted industry and its surrounding
community. The administrator's staff had to focus on trade-offs between jobs,
prices, energy, and the environment to protect the agency against damaging
charges that its actions were contributing to unemployment, inflation, and
energy dependence. As a result, the agency developed a short-term focus
rather than the long-term perspective needed for considering broad options
and goals.
Decisions on comprehensive environmental policy ran a good risk of
upsetting major political groups, while in turn not making any other group
happy. After the oil embargo of 1973, the Planning and Evaluation Office
analyzed the use of scrubber technology for power plants. It suggested that in
84. See, for example, FY77 Regional Guidance (EPA, Feb 18, 1976).
85. For example, in 1974 the quantifiable outputs in water pollution included: (1) water waste
treatment plants in compliance with standards; (2) enforcement actions taken; (3) state permit
programs approved; (4) agricultural permits issued; (5) ocean dumping permits issued; and (6)
construction grants awarded.
86. See, for example, Economic Analysis of Proposed Effluent Guidelines: Fruit and Vegetable Processing
IndustrN (EPA, 1973).
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rural areas industry be permitted to use supplementary control systems
without scrubbers-a suggestion that outraged environmentalists. At the
same time, it suggested that industry install scrubbers on all new power plants
in urban areas-a suggestion that outraged industry. Political pressures such
as these often kept the administrator's staff from making any decisions on
controversial issues and restrained the agency's attempts to pursue a
comprehensive environmental policy.
4. Researchers. A major component in implementing CEM involved
reorganizing environmental research along functional lines. Coordination
among research projects was required to help the programs and regions deal
with the environment in its entirety. However, EPA inherited a large,
unwieldy research arm from the old environmental programs, consisting of
fifteen diverse research laboratories in nine states. In 1972, the research
office had a $165 million budget and 2,000 employees from sixty different
scientific and professional disciplines who were widely dispersed in the United
States.
Researchers and laboratories resisted attempts by Washington to
coordinate research operations. To a large extent, the laboratories retained
their old identities rather than fitting into the new organizational scheme. For
example, under a plan to consolidate laboratories into four National
Environmental Research Centers ("NERC"), 8 7 the North Carolina NERC was
supposed to perform research only in the area of health and welfare effects.
However, it continued to do work in all areas of air pollution, while a
Cincinnati laboratory continued its research into health and welfare effects.
Agency scientists who had spent many years of their lives on specific
projects were reluctant to abandon them suddenly because headquarters
called for a reorganization. They argued that their current skills were not
readily transferable to other fields of research. For instance, the water
research program was strongly oriented toward developing technology for
treating point source waste, while the air pollution research program was
mostly concerned with health effects. Scientists in these programs argued that
it was at best inefficient and at worst impossible for them to shift gears
abruptly and devote their energies to new fields of research. Moreover,
Congress itself blocked plans to consolidate and upgrade the laboratories.
For example, it resisted the closing of outdated laboratories because they
were community institutions that provided employment to local citizens.
Furthermore, the laboratory managers themselves opposed reorganization
87. The first Assistant Administrator for Research and Monitoring, Stanley Greenfield,
attempted to consolidate data and coordinate research operations by creating four National
Environmental Research Centers ("NERC"). He tried to match NERC themes with the previous
capability and major expertise of the laboratories. The Corvallis, Oregon center, with reporting
laboratories in seven locations throughout the United States, was supposed to be organized around
the theme of ecological effects. The Cincinnati center, with laboratories in three locations, had as its
theme pollution control technology. The Research Triangle Park, North Carolina facility stressed
health effects and had laboratories in four states. Finally, Las Vegas, which had laboratories in five
locations, emphasized monitoring.
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along functional lines because, if properly implemented, it would give
Washington control over their operations. The research scientists in the
laboratories considered themselves to be independent professionals doing
pure science, as opposed to the scientists at headquarters who combined
science with politics and management;8 8 to them, Washington scientists did
not understand how the laboratory should function. Therefore, laboratory
managers maintained that headquarters should be separated from the day-today operations of the laboratories.
Finally, even if the laboratories had been reorganized, it is unlikely they
could have contributed greatly toward achieving a comprehensive
environmental management plan. According to EPA researchers, their first
priority had to be upgrading the state of the art. They needed ongoing
interaction with their professional counterparts in academia and in industry so
their own work would be of comparable quality and reliability. And, since the
environmental discipline was undeveloped, pure research was more important
than practical research.
This approach was inconsistent with the needs of the programs and
regions, which focused on technical support and service, and required
knowledge and equipment that applied to unique problems. Researchers,
however, maintained that since ecological sciences were underdeveloped,
such definitive answers could not be produced immediately. Also, researchers
felt that if they started a new project every six months because of immediate
needs and did not develop an overall, long-term plan, the discipline of
environmental sciences would never mature enough to cope with the difficult
problems of the future.
As a result of their resistance to change, the scientists' role became
technology development and transfer, not technology application.8 9 More
broadly, the inability of the agency to functionalize the research arm
contributed significantly to the failure of regions and programs to deal with
the environment as a whole. 90
88. See, for example, Walter Hirsch, Scientists in American Society (Random House, 1968);James L.
Penick, Jr., et al, The Politics of American Science (Rand McNally, 1965).
89. This method was used with monitoring. Researchers solved the problem of standard
analytical methods and designed the monitoring system using flow charts to figure out the part of the
river, the portion of the air, and the industries on which the equipment should be installed. They
provided the regional offices with quality control procedures for the surveillance required by statute,
and the regions applied these procedures by doing the actual monitoring. On EPA's monitoring
problems, see Task Force Report: EPA Strategy for Managing Monitoring. Issues and Alternatives (EPA,
1972); First Report of the Environmental Measures Project: Analysis and Applications of Environmental Quality
Indicators (EPA, 1975); Surveillance and Analysis Division Study (EPA, 1975); Air Pollution Indices Used in the
United States and Canada (CEQ & EPA, 1975).
90. The regions required very specific information. For example, a regional administrator
might want to know the ramifications from the runoff of alkaline Colorado soil into the area's rivers.
One regional administrator's request for information would be combined with similar requests for
information from other regions by the research office. Seeking to get as much knowledge for the
fewest dollars possible, the research office combined thousands of agency requests into a much
smaller group of projects. The different questions about soil alkalinity and runoff would be
perceived as a complicated problem that required the completion of three or four tasks for a
solution. Part of each task might be carried out in-house and part might be contracted out or done
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Information Barriers

There remains a final question of whether CEM could have been achieved
at all. Even if authority had been organized along functional lines, the
intellectual tools for comprehensively managing the environment may not
have been available. The Council on Environmental Quality admits:
Our ignorance of the interrelationship of separate pollution problems is a handicap in
devising control strategies .... Indeed, does it do any good to talk about pollution in
general, or must we deal with a series of particular pollution problems-radiation,
pesticides, solid waste? A systems approach is needed, but what kind of system?

[Miuch more thought is necessary before we can be confident that we have the
intellectual tools necessary
to delineate accurately the problem and long-range
91
strategies for action.

EPA's monitoring system required state agencies and regional programs
to provide information suitable for enforcing particular statutes but was not
appropriate for evaluating overall environmental quality. For example, the
agency could determine how many states were violating air quality standards
and how many industries were not complying with their permits. The agency
had trouble, however, moving from these facts about violators to figures
about overall air and water quality.
Another major problem was the length of time it took to gather and
analyze data. The best data available at a given moment was almost always
out of date. 9 2 This created problems with definitions of air and water quality.
National standards defined air quality in terms of the emissions of six
pollutants into the atmosphere: total suspended particulates, sulphur
dioxide, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, nitrogen dioxide, and
hydrocarbons. Scientists had discovered these pollutants many years earlier,
and it was no longer certain if they still represented the most dangerous
emissions. In 1975, the Council on Environmental Quality admitted: "It is
becoming increasingly evident that the air pollutants upon which our
standards and monitoring have been focusing do not represent all important
parameters of air quality. In some cases, they may not even represent the
most important or informative ones." 93 In 1975, water pollution standards
used sixteen general variables, fifteen trace metals, and twelve pesticides for
evaluation, but countless other factors could have been taken into account.
For instance, PCBs only had been discovered to be dangerous in 1971, and
the list of water pollutants was constantly growing. Without information
about the total exposure to humans and the environment, the agency could
not trace pollutants through the eco-chain, examine interactions among them,
and identify where interdiction was most fitting.
by grant. The total report would be returned to the regional administrators in pieces of varying
quality. The pieces would examine the problem in general and would have little to say about the
region's specific problem. The regions were dissatisfied with this "needs" system, because they had
numerous detailed needs that the system left unsatisfied.
91. CEQ, Environmental Quality: The Sivth Annual Report 326 (US Govt Printing Office, 1975).
92. See id at 336-37.
93. ld at 326, 336-37.
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VI
CONCLUSION:

THE IMPLICATIONS OF

EPA's

STRUCTURE

After this long story of EPA's origins and early development, I am now in a
position to speculate about the impact EPA's structure had on the policies it
adopted. First, I reiterate what I believe to be the distinctive features of EPA's
structure. Then, I consider what types of policy implications may be derived
from these structural features.
This article has identified three unique features of EPA's structure. First,
EPA has been given a status in the federal bureaucracy as an environmental
agency and not a natural resource and environment department as once
contemplated by Roy Ash, one of its founders. Second, EPA has largely
retained a programmatic format. Internally, it remains divided among its air,
water, solid waste, pesticide, and other components, rather than having a
thorough-going functional design as envisaged by Alain Enthoven, another
94
prominent founder.
A third distinct feature of EPA is that it is an independent regulatory
agency without plural leadership. It is neither a component of another
department like some agencies (for example, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration in the Department of Labor or the Food and Drug
Administration in the Health and Human Services Department), nor is it
outside a department and governed by a group of commissioners (like the
Federal Trade Commission or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). Rather,
EPA has a single leader. 9 5
EPA's structure has had some notably deleterious consequences for the
agency. The focus on the environment to the exclusion of natural resources
has limited EPA's response to supply interruptions, specifically the energy
price hikes of 1973, 1979, and 1990. Conceptually, too, natural resource and
environmental issues are intimately connected. Consider, for instance, their
unity in both the scholarly and theoretical work done by the economically
oriented think-tank Resources for the Future, 9 6 the partisan work done by the
conservationist and promoter of alternative life-styles, Amory Lovins, 9 7 and
the way they manifest themselves in an issue such as carbon dioxide
buildup. 98 Because EPA is separate from the Department of Energy and parts
94.

Interestingly, both Ash and Enthoven have their roots in the business sector where the form

an organization takes is not as influenced by interest group pressures and congressional enactments.

95.

Since its inception in 1970, EPA has had only six administrators (William Ruckelshaus, who

was the head of the agency twice, Russell Train, Douglas Costle, Anne Gorsuch, Lee Thomas, and at

present William Reilly).
96.
For an example of scholarly work by Resources for the Future that ties together energy and
environmental issues, see V. K. Smith, ed, Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered (Johns Hopkins Press,

1979).
97.

Lovins' most influential book remains Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace (Friends of the

Earth, 1977).
98. The source of carbon dioxide buildup is the burning of fossil fuels. The need for fossil fuels
generates society's energy problems, while the burning of these fuels yields serious environmental
difficulties. A simultaneous attack on these two problems would permit an integrated resolution,
rather than two solutions at odds with each other.
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of the Department of the Interior, it cannot fully exploit the insights of
thinkers in these departments or the connections that exist between
environmental and resource issues.
It is hard to attack environmental problems without running into resource
and energy problems. As indicated, the biggest source of environmental
degradation is the burning of fossil fuels to produce energy. A tax on fossil
fuels would have many beneficial effects, from lowering pollution to reducing
U.S. dependence on unstable sources of foreign supply. It also could help
reduce the budget deficit, as many legislators now have discovered.
Nonetheless, EPA has not been in a position to advocate a tax on energy
consumption for any purpose other than pollution reduction, and the Energy
Department has been similarly limited because of its restricted focus on
energy. Neither government body has been able to draw the relevant
implications from the connection between issues.
At the time of EPA's birth, no one anticipated that energy would so rapidly
follow environmental protection as a cause of national concern. Rather,
among EPA's designers (primarily lawyers and non-economists who
considered themselves to be political realists), the dominant view was that
there were very sound reasons for separating the environmental from natural
resource programs. Avoiding conflicts of interest between developers and
pollution control advocates was expressed as "keeping the fox out of the
chicken coop."
Second, it may be argued that the retention of EPA's separate programs
has limited EPA's abilities to deal comprehensively with broad, cross-program
environmental challenges (such as developing global warming or cancer
policies). Because EPA focuses on separate parts of the environment, it has
not been able to exploit fully the obvious connections between environmental
problems. Here the major reason for lack of change was not EPA's founders,
who were basically sympathetic to the idea of integrated environmental
management. Rather, Congress encouraged fragmentation by passing
numerous environmental statutes and creating separate oversight structures
for each of them. The incentive for Congress has been to enact more and
different legislation in order to please voters in home districts. The incentive
has not been to streamline agency operations or to get EPA officials to think
broadly and comprehensively about environmental problems. No bill to
broaden EPA's management options has ever received serious consideration
from Congress. Rather, Congress micro-manages EPA in many respects by
providing explicit instructions about what problems to address and when and
how to address them. This micro-management by Congress severely
constrains EPA from balancing the costs and benefits of its many activities and
from coming up with a rational calculus of what it should and should not do.
Again in this instance, there was conscious intent to set up EPA in this
fashion. However, the intent here did not come from EPA's founders but
from Congress itself, which had suffered much criticism in the 1960s for not
having paid adequate attention to pollution control. EPA's statutory legacy
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was a response to these criticisms. Congress spotted an issue that the public
seemed to care passionately about (an issue that could decide elections) and
latched onto it with remarkable tenacity. The result: perhaps no other
regulatory agency in the federal government must administer so many
separate laws with such differing and explicitly detailed requirements. Thus,
EPA probably has less real discretion than most federal regulatory agencies.
Third, it may be argued that the creation of a single administrator of EPA
has given this individual substantial discretionary powers to mold agency
direction (subject to all the limitations previously mentioned) in many subtle
and important ways. The power of the EPA administrator is much greater
than the power of commissioners in comparable agencies such as NRC or
FTC. This power can be exercised for better or worse, depending on the
capabilities and perspective of the person holding this position.
The role of EPA administrators in molding agency policies is important
beyond the scope of this already lengthy article. 99 Nonetheless, the points
made here about EPA's origins, and the influence of its structure on its
policies have to be considered if EPA is to be reformed to serve national
policy needs better.

99. See Mark Landy, Marc Roberts & Stephen Thomas, The EnironmentalProtectioii Ageicy: Asking
the Wriong Questoios (Oxford U Press, 1990).

